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Smoking: Social Unacceptability Issue< PREVIOUS | 246803 | NEXT >
From: afoxland@starband.net
Date: Tue, 08/12/03

Anne LandmanPosting Date:  Tuesday, August 12, 2003
      Smoking: Social Unacceptability Issue 

      Company/Source:  Philip Morris (now a a division of Altria Group)
      Document Date: Jan 1976
      Length: 15 pages
      Bates No. 2025025481/5494   
      URL: http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/2025025481-5494.html 
      PDF Version: http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/2025025481-5494.pdf 


          This confidential 1976 Tobacco Institute report describes the
seriousness of the impact on the industry of the decline in social acceptability
of smoking:

          "At the Chairman's Conference in Hot Springs, Va., there was unanimous
agreement that   
            the social unacceptability issue constitutes 'a more serious threat
to the industry's future
            than any other aspect of the attack on smoking...' " 

          The paper then describes the tobacco industry's intent to undermine
the government's public health efforts to control tobacco: "With the advent of
the Surgeon General's Report in January 1964,...[the Tobacco Institute] became
the Industry's principal means for trying to influence or thwart legislative
activities involving tobacco..." 

          The paper warns that even one law regulating smoking "is one too
many," saying: 

           "Even if 9 out of 10 [smoking restriction] bills are defeated, the
one that becomes law...is
             one too many. It generally receives a great deal of publicity and
strengthens anti-smoking
             measures, encouraging non-smoker rebellion..." 

          The paper describes the Institute's early efforts to reverse the
decline in social acceptability of smoking by creating a "roadshow" of "industry
emissaries"--"a young, intelligent and attractive couple" who, after "intensive
orientation and preparation" were sent out to "make timely appearances in states
where anti-smoking proposals were before the legislatures." The writer boasts
that as a result, "...[F]or the first time, the Industry's viewpoint was being
heard and read, not as paid advertising, but rather through personal advocacy in
open discussion," and that "there is much misinformation in anti-smoking
propaganda," and that, "...the emissaries are demonstrating that the smoking and
health issue is still very much a controversy..." 

      The paper describes how the Institute expanded upon its success with
"emissaries," saying "If a breakthrough is made by a battalion of emissaries,
why not send a division into the breach!" 

      This seems to be an early formative document describing the tobacco
industry's adversarial position and efforts to undermine the success of
government and public health communication about the diseases caused by
tobacco.
      ---------------------------------------------- 
            Notes
            This document was found in a Philip Morris file entitled, "Operation
Berkshire." (See definition of Operation Berkshire, below.)
            ----------------------------------------------
           
            Quotes:

            SMOKING: SOCIAL UNACCEPTABILITY ISSUE 

            At the Chairman's Conference in Hot Springs, Va., there was
unanimous agreement that the social unacceptability issue constitutes "a more
serious threat to the industry's future than any other aspect of the attack on
smoking." 

            Reports show that the issue has been gaining strength, particularly
over the past three years, and presently shows no signs of abating. In fact,
recent developments indicate widespread and broadening support for segregating
smokers in designated places. The intensity of activity in this respect among
U.S. state legislatures was about four times greater in 1975 than in the
previous year, resulting in 22 bills restricting smoking in public places being
enacted into law. 

            Many national organizations which previously had taken anti-smoking
positions solely on the basis of health consequences to smokers have now found
in the social unacceptability issue a new form of attack which (1) actively
enlists the support of non-smokers, (b) gives some legislators a perceived cause
for responding to their non-smoking constituents by sponsoring or supporting
restrictive bills, (c) arouses guilt complexes of smokers, and (d) puts the
industry and its employees further on the defensive. 

            The result is that the traditional health argument against smoking
has now been joined by a potent psychological and behavioral insinuation. First,
the smoker was told that he was harming his own health; then the government was
persuaded that smoking is a sufficient public health hazard to require remedial
action. Now, the smoker is being depicted as an inconsiderate, annoying, selfish
person who is harming not only his own health but also that of the non-smoker;
thus, restrictive measures are being proposed and enacted to protect the
non-smokers from smokers in public places... 

            [From Page 7, Bates No. 2025025486]: 

            Ideas and Proposals for Positive Action 

            In the U.S. we have been making efforts (1) to monitor local, state
and national activities relating to the social unacceptability issue, and (2) to
conduct legislative lobbying activities and relations programs as countervailing
measures. 

            These efforts are primarily made through the Tobacco Institute, an
industry organization comprised of 11 companies that manufacture and market
tobacco products... 

            [From Page 8] 

            ...Obviously, with the advent of the Surgeon General's Report in
January 1964, the Institute was called upon to represent the Industry's
interests beyond the collection and dissemination of information. It had to
develop a responsive mechanism which, in many instances, made it the spokesman
for the industry; and, in addition, it became the Industry's principal means for
trying to influence or thwart legislative activities involving tobacco... 

            ...Reference was made earlier to the fact that 22 bills restricting
smoking in public places had been enacted into law by state legislatures in
1975. Actually, there were 167 other similar bills that were introduced but NOT
enacted. While it would be difficult and perhaps too optimistic to credit The
Institute with the defeat of those unenacted bills, we can nevertheless conclude
that its influence was evident. 

            ...Thus,we have an organized system for alerting U.S. Industry to
proposals to restrict smoking and for taking an aggressive role in opposing such
actions by state legislations and in the courts. It is our opinion, however,
that more emphasis must be placed on this particular role of The Institute. Even
if 9 out of 10 bills are defeated, the one that becomes law and restricts
certain public smoking is one too many. It generally receives a great deal of
publicity and strengthens anti-smoking measure, encouraging non-smoker
rebellions and further assaults the rights and conscience of the smokers. With
the mounting campaign to make smoking unacceptable in public places, through
non-smoker sentiment and smoker guilt, the Industry will have to marshal all its
resources. Surely, legislative activities need to be pursued and, in appropriate
cases, litigation proceedings instituted in order to assert and protect tobacco
interests... 

            [From Page 10, Bates No. 2025025489] 

            INDUSTRY EMISSARIES 

            A novel and somewhat courageous move was made by the Institute last
year in an attempt to bring Industry advocacy to the local level.  Previously,
certain executives of the Institute had been conducting an occasional roadshow,
coming face to face with local and regional news media representatives in brief
meetings.  The results were somewhat promising...[I]t was evident that the media
would listen to Industry spokesmen and report objectively about "the other side
of the smoking and health controversy."  Encouraged that an organized team of
full-time spokesmen could accomplish more than the occasional roadshow
briefings, The Institute employed two young, intelligent and attractive
people--a man and a woman--who had experience in government and a background in
journalism.  After an intensive orientation and preparation, they were sent out
as Industry emissaries.  In the first six months, they made appearances in over
half the States before hundreds of audiences and given scores of interviews to
newspaper, TV and radio reporters. 

            That effort continued through 1975 with increasing intensity. 
Attempts were made to make timely appearances in the states where anti-smoking
proposals were before the legislatures...They appeared before community groups
and civic clubs, making appeals for fair-mindedness toward another point of
view. 

            The results? ...[F]or the first time, the Industry's viewpoint was
being heard and read, not as paid advertising, but rather through personal
advocacy in open discussion.  This added a new dimension and a promising
opportunity for reaching both small and large audiences with an essential
multi-message: cigarettes are a lawful product, there is much misinformation in
anti-smoking propaganda; the public has a right to the facts; courtesy on the
part of smokers is a reasonable expectation; and the decision to smoke should be
made on the basis of personal, mature judgment and is not a matter for
government edicts... 

            If a breakthrough is made by a battalion of emissaries, why not send
a division to the breach!  To test this reasoning, The Institute employed two
additional full-time articulate speakers, again a man and a woman with suitable
backgrounds.  In the last year and a half, the team has traveled more than
130,000 miles in 42 states, appearing not only on local platforms but also on
national television programs....By and large, we believe the results have given
the Industry some positive visibility... 

            ...The smoker is looking for support and reassurance, as are our own
employees. We cannot hope to do battle on the scientific front with the
expectation of winning over adversary physicians...However, these young men and
women are articulating a point of view that otherwise would not be expressed.
They are appealing directly to the public for open-minded fairness...They give
the industry a voice on the firing line...
           
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
           
            Company: Philip Morris (now a division of Altria Group) 
            Author: Presumed author, Tobacco Institute  
            Recipient: Presumed corporate recipient, Philip Morris 
            Region: United States 
            Litigation: STMN/Produced 
            Operation/Project:   Found in a file called Operation Berkshire     
  Operation Berkshire was the name tobacco industry executives gave to a series
of meetings held in the mid-1970's between the major cigarette makers of the
U.S. and Europe whereby the companies agreed to unite to fight public health
trends against tobacco that were effectively reducing nicotine consumption and
tobacco use worldwide. 
           
            Type: REPT, REPORT, OTHER 
            Named Organization: Chairmans Conference
            Instititue State Activities Division
            National Assn of Tobacco Distributors
            TI, Tobacco Institute 
            Named Person: Surgeon General 
            Subject: Social Acceptability (Social acceptability of smoking)     
  The industry fought the decline in social acceptability of smoking through
public relations campaigns, undermining legislation, etc. 

            social influence
            Secondhand smoke strategy (Corporate strategy to deal with ETS
issue)
            industry activity
            industry influence
            industry response
            industry strategy
            smoking attitude
            smoking restriction 
     


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Correction:  In the posting of Monday, August 11, 2003 (Oslo Conference, 1993
PM), it was incorrectly stated that Steven Parrish (Senior Vice President of PM
USA in 1993) went on to become head of the company.  As far as we can
distinguish from the documents, Steven Parrish did not move beyond Senior Vice
President of PM.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


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Anne Landman

American Lung Association of Colorado

Tobacco Document Research Annex

P.O. Box 23105

Glade Park, CO 81523

(970) 263-9199

Fax (970) 263-9799

afoxland@starband.net

 

 


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