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Anti-Tobacco Industry Plan< PREVIOUS | 247177 | NEXT >
From: anne@tobaccodocuments.org
Date: Wed, 03/26/08

Current Posting Date: Wednesday, March 26, 2008
Original Posting Date:  Saturday, April 8, 2006
Anti-Tobacco Industry Plan

Document Date: 1996 (est.)
Length: 15 pages
Bates No.: 2063393705/3719
URL of original posting: http://tobaccodocuments.org/landman/ 
2063393705-3719.html
Document images: http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/tid/byg53a00

This Philip Morris (PM) presentation describes a comprehensive, long  
term plan by PM to divide the ranks of tobacco control groups and  
weaken their efforts to reduce tobacco use.  Public health  
authorities, groups and individuals who work to reduce smoking are  
known collectively inside PM as the "anti-tobacco industry," (ATI, or  
"antis" for short).   PM regarded them as competitors seeking to take  
away market share.  PM's "Anti-Tobacco Industry Plan" was devised by  
Joshua ("Josh") Slavitt, Director of Policy and Programs at PM  
Management Corporation.  Slavitt was considered PM's internal expert  
on "the antis" and their strategies.  For more information on  
Slavitt, or to contribute additional information on him, see his  
profile on SourceWatch at http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php? 
title=Joshua_Slavitt

Part of Slavitt's plan was to cause dissent among to tobacco control  
groups by "enhancing internal conflicts" among them.  To carry out  
this strategy, PM sought what it considered "moderate" anti-tobacco  
groups, and worked to enter into relationships with them and get them  
to work with the company in some cooperative capacity.   Another  
strategy was to "limit or redirect" public health funding away from  
tobacco control programs PM didn't like, and direct it to programs of  
which PM approved (specifically those that didn't harm cigarette  
sales or the image of smoking) like "youth education, preventing  
youth access, etc."  PM also worked to stimulate financial  
investigations of public health groups to weaken them and "challenge  
their so-called 'white hat' image with elected officials and the media."

PM estimated that it would cost $500,000 to carry out the program for  
the first year.

--------------------------------------

Quotes:
Anti-Tobacco Industry Plan

We have spent considerable time discussing the importance of  
developing a response to the anti's. We like to call them the Anti- 
Tobacco Industry because they have the economic and political  
resources to deserve to be called an industry.

• Today, I'd like to present you with a plan that will coordinate  
company and external resources to diminish the effectiveness of the  
Anti-Tobacco Industry.

• Our plan also seeks to moderate the ATI's impact on the policy  
process so that we can reestablish our credibility through the  
initiatives that we are developing.

• After we have implemented these initiatives we must continue to  
keep pressure on the ATI so that we can restore and maintain balance  
in the political process and with the media.

• Just as importantly, we need a plan with obtainable goals and  
performance measurements that can be tracked over time.

Strategies

There are four strategies to our plan. We want to:

1) Limit public funding sources available to the ATI --ultimately  
make the ATI more accountable for both the private and public sources  
of revenue that its members receive.

2) Weaken the ATI's credibility by challenging their so-called "white  
hat" image with elected officials and the media.

3) Put the ATI on the defensive to enhance internal conflicts and  
cause divisions among its leadership regarding strategies and tactics  
--this is a natural outgrowth of our first and second strategies.

4) Conduct a comprehensive competitive intelligence effort on the ATI  
to better understand its strategies and long-term goals --just as we  
would address any other business adversary.

Let me discuss our fourth strategy first.

Strategy 1: Intensify Research

-Competitive intelligence is the bedrock of any successful business  
effort. We must view our effort to respond to the ATI the same way.  
We want to:

1) Identify and learn about the makeup of the ATI's leaders and  
organizations.

2) Identify emerging trends, issues and strategies.

3) Analyze their potential vulnerabilities and ours as a result of  
their activities.

-Information we gather will be warehoused in a database which we call  
Common Ground.

-Competitive intelligence on the ATI is integral to our plan because  
it enables us to prioritize our near-term and longer-term strategies.

-Competitive intelligence also gives us the opportunity to develop  
proactive and offensive responses to the ATI --this is critical to  
our ability to put them on the defensive as we restore balance in the  
debate over our issues.

[From Page --3710]:

Strategy 2: Limit Funding

Our second strategy focuses on limiting funding available to the ATI.  
We want to identify opportunities to:

1) Limit or redirect federal and state funding. However,to do this,we  
also need to first decide what types of anti-tobacco programs are  
acceptable to us, e.g. youth education, public advertising campaigns,  
preventing youth access, etc.

2) In order to accomplish this effort, we will have to highlight  
waste and abuses in publicly funded programs. Our primary focus will  
be on legislators, but we'll also have to generate media stories in  
order to reinforce this message.

3) We already know that the ATI receives a minimum of $600 million a  
year from public and private sources. This is hardly small change at  
a time when a number of social activists are competing for a  
shrinking pool of public funding.

The ATI has reached the level of funding where they should be  
considered fair game by other social activists--if these other  
activists knew just how much the ATI was receiving. Naturally,we want  
to make this information available. However, we also want to identify  
the right groups to provide this information.

[From Page --3716]:

Strategy 4: Divide Ranks

Our Fourth Strategy focuses on efforts to cause dissention within the  
ATI.

1) As the tobacco company that is seeking "reasonable solutions to  
complex problems" we want to reach out to members of the ATI where we  
can potentially establish Common Ground--such as on the issue of  
preventing youth access to tobacco products.

Strategy 4 Process Measurements:

For 1997,we will:

1) Complete the process of comparing the company's positions with  
anti-tobacco control advocates.

2) We also want to see a measurable increase in the number of  
legislators at the federal, state and local levels who publicly  
endorse AAA and our Federal Initiative.

3) When we've made measurable advances on these two steps, we will  
then reach out to groups and individuals where Common Ground is  
possible. Combined with our advances on our second and third  
strategies, we have an opportunity to increase pressure on the ATI,  
which can be used to cause additional divisions within the ATI.

--We expect, that as their funding is squeezed and investigations are  
launched on potential violations of state and local lobbying laws,  
some ATI advocates may think pragmatically about accepting our offer  
to work together to address the youth issue as well as other issues  
where we can arrive at a consensus.

This effort will cause further dissention between those anti groups  
that seek prohibition at any cost and those who are truly concerned  
about achieving reasonable solutions...

2) We also want to enhance internal conflicts that already exist  
within the ATI --and possibly encourage some new ones.

--------------------------------------------------------

Company
Philip Morris
Author
No author specified. Suspected author: Josh Slavitt
Slavitt, Joshua (PM Issues Manager, 1992; Dir. of Policy & Programs  
at PMMC,)
     Handled "It's the Law" program for Philip Morris
     (Based on 2070437692/7704)
Recipient
Presumed recipient: Philip Morris employees (probably from government  
or corporate affairs departments)
Region
United States
Named Organization
American Cancer Society
American Lung Association
Coalition for Tobacco Free Kids
Common Ground Database
FEC Database
HHS, U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services
IRS, Internal Revenue Service
Steering Committee
U.S. House (of Representatives)
Anti-tobacco industry (Philip Morris' internal term for public health  
authorities, )
Often shortened to "The Antis."
Litigation
FEDA/Produced
Named Person
Banzhaf, John F., III (Exec. Dir. Action of Smoking & Health (ASH))
Executive Director of Action on Smoking and Health (ASH).Professor of  
Law at Georgetown. Banzhaf succeeded in using the Fairness Doctrine  
to get cigarette commercials off television in 1968.  See Banzhaf  
FCC, 405 F, 2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (affirming FCC ruling that radio  
and television stations must devote a significant amount of broadcast  
time to case against smoking).  ASH publishes Smoking and Health  
Review bulletins. "A leading anti-smoking activist" (Chic. Sun-Times  
6/23/93). Action on Smoking and Health is located at 2013 H Street,  
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. (Castano Expert List) See Action on  
Smoking a Health, TTLA Almanac - Names.
Bonilla, Henry (Republican House Representative from Texas' 23rd Dist.)
Assisted Philip Morris with investigations and attacks on public  
health programs to reduce tobacco use.  Also a top recipient of  
alcohol industry contributions (see http://www.cspinet.org/booze/ 
underagedrinking.ondcp5.htm)
Borelli, Thomas J. (Mgr., Corporate Scientific Affairs, PM 1990)
Manager of Corporate Scientific Affairs for Philip Morris in 1990.  
Also worked for PM Corporate Services in Brussels.
Daragan, Karen (Public/Media Relations, PM Corp. Affairs)
Manager of media relations for Philip Morris USA 1993-94. Later  
worked with Carolyn Levy in PM's youth smoking prevention department.
L., David [May refer to David Laufer, Philip Morris' Regional  
Director of Government Affairs 1995-96 ]
L., Howard [May refer to Howard Liebengood, VP of Government Affairs  
in Washington, D.C. c. 1997]
Meyers, Matt, Esq. (Head of National Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids)
Pertschuk, Michael (Former chair of FTC (c. 1984))
Slavitt, Joshua (PM Issues Manager, 1992; Dir. of Policy & Programs  
at PMMC,)
Handled "It's the Law" program for Philip Morris
Antis
Type
REPT, REPORT, OTHER
Subject
Corporate strategy
corporate intelligence
public health program



----------------------------------------------------
This service is provided by Anne Landman, editor of  
www.TobaccoWiki.org, and is a project of the Center for Media and  
Democracy and
Tobacco Documents Online at www.TobaccoDocuments.org


Anne Landman
TobaccoWiki Editor
Center for Media and Democracy
anne@sourcewatch.org
(970) 216-9842 Cell




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